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We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and
greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments
creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this “overjustiﬁca-
tion eﬀect” can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The
model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior,
and those where disclosing one’s generosity may backﬁre. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium
contracts oﬀered by sponsors, including the level and conﬁdentiality or publicity of incentives.
Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social
welfare by requiring agents to engage in ineﬃcient sacriﬁces.
Keywords: altruism, rewards, motivation, overjustiﬁcation eﬀect, crowding out, identity, social
norms.
JEL Classiﬁcation: JEL Classiﬁcation: D64, D82, H41, Z13.Introduction
People frequently engage in activities that are costly to themselves and mostly beneﬁto t h e r s .
They vote, volunteer time, help strangers, give to political or charitable organizations, donate
b l o o d ,j o i nr e s c u es q u a d sa n ds o m e t i m e se v e nr i s ko rs a c r i ﬁce their life for strangers. Many
experiments and ﬁeld studies conﬁrm that a signiﬁcant fraction of individuals engage in altruistic
or reciprocal behaviors (e.g., Fehr and Gächter (2000), Buraschi and Cornelli (2002)). A number
of important phenomena and puzzles, however,c a n n o tb ee x p l a i n e db yt h es o l ep r e s e n c eo f
individuals with other-regarding preferences.
First, providing rewards and punishments in order to increase prosocial behavior sometimes
has a perverse eﬀect, reducing the total contribution provided by agents. Such a crowding-
out of “intrinsic motivation” by extrinsic incentives has been observed in the realms of social
interactions, provision of public goods, tax compliance, volunteering, and experimental labor
contracts (see Frey (1997) and Frey and Jegen (2001) for surveys). Studying schoolchildren
collecting donations for a charitable organization, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) thus found that
they collected less money when given performance incentives (see also Frey and Götte (1999) on
volunteer work supply). This is in line with the idea in Titmuss (1970), who argued that paying
blood donors could actually reduce supply. On the punishment side, Akerlof and Dickens (1982)
suggested that imposing stiﬀer penalties for crimes might sometimes be counterproductive, by
undermining individuals’ “internal justiﬁcation” for obeying the law. Frey (1997) provided
evidence to that eﬀect concerning tax compliance, and Gneezy and Rustichini found (2000a)
that ﬁning parents for picking up their children late from day-care centers resulted in more
late arrivals. In experiments on labor contracting, Fehr et al. (2001) and Fehr and Gächter
(2002)) found that subjects provided less eﬀort when the contract speciﬁed ﬁnes for inadequate
performance than when it did not. These ﬁndings are in line with a large literature in psychology
that has documented many instances where explicit incentives for task performance lead to
decreased motivation and reduced long-run performance (see, e.g. Festinger and Carlsmith
(1959), Deci (1975), Deci and Ryan (1985)). In studying this class of phenomena, however,
one cannot simply assume that rewards and punishments systematically crowd out spontaneous
contributions. Indeed, there is also much evidence to support the basic premise of economics
that incentives are generally eﬀective, for instance in workplace contexts (e.g., Gibbons (1997),
Prendergast (1999), and Lazear (2000a,b)).1 A more discriminating analysis is thus required.
Second, people commonly perform good deeds and refrain from selﬁsh ones because of social
pressure and norms that attach honor to the former and shame to the latter (e.g., Batson
(1998), Freeman(1997)). Charitable and non-proﬁt institutions make ample use of donors’ desire
1Even in the speciﬁc situations considered above, it is clear that rewards are not aversive per se. For instance,
organizations that collect blood try to make it a relatively pleasant experience for donors, and increasing the dis-
comfort or time costs is unlikely to increase supply. With respect to charitable contributions, a simple comparison
of US and (say) France suggests that their tax treatment does matter in the anticipated way.
1to publicly demonstrate their generosity and selﬂessness (or at least the appearance thereof):
available displays range from lapel pins and T-shirts to plaques in opera houses, or buildings
named after large contributors. The presence of a social signalling motive for giving, as distinct
from pure altruism, is also evident in the fact that anonymous donations are both extremely
rare —typically, less than 1 percent of the total number2— and widely considered to be the most
admirable; conversely, boasting of one’s generous contributions is largely self-defeating. Codes
of honor, whose stringency and scope varies considerably across time and societies, are another
example of norms enforced largely through feelings of shame (losing face) or glory, leading
individuals to engage in self-sacriﬁce for reputational reasons. To understand these mechanisms
it is again important to not posit exogenous social constraints, but rather to model the inferences
involved in sustaining such norms and the external factors facilitating or inhibiting them.
Finally, as much as people care about the opinion others have of them, they care about their
own self-image —or, as the expression goes, being able to look at themselves in the mirror. Adam
Smith (1776) eloquently described this motive for acting in a moral or unselﬁsh way, in terms of
individuals assessing their own conduct through the eyes of an “impartial spectator”, an “ideal
mate within the breast”:
“We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and im-
partial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we
thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which inﬂuenced it, we approve of
it, by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise,
we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.”
In more contemporary terms, psychologists and sociologists describe people’s behavior as
being inﬂuenced by a strong need to maintain conformity between one’s behavior, or even
feelings, and certain values, long-term goals or identities.3 Recent empirical studies conﬁrm
the importance of such self-image concerns and their contribution to prosocial behavior.4 In
particular, a clever experiment by Dana et al. (2003) reveals that when people are given the
opportunity to remain ignorant of how their choices aﬀect others, or of their precise role in the
2See, e.g., the studies reported in Glazer and Konrad (1996, p.1021). Note that anonymous contributions have
the same tax-deduction beneﬁts as nonanonymous ones.
3Thus Batson (1998) writes that “The ability to pat oneself on the back and feeling god about being a kind, caring
person, can be a powerful incentive to help”; he also discusses the anticipation of guilt. Kahneman and Knetsch
(1992) ﬁnd that subjects’ stated willingness to pay for alternative publics goods is well predicted by independent
assessments of the associated “moral satisfaction”. Lamont (2000) documents the importance attached by her
interviewees to the presence or absence of the “caring self” not just in others, but also in themselves (being
sensitive to the needs of others, not taking advantage of them, trusting and being trusted).
4For instance, in a transportation-related survey of about 1,300 individuals, Johansson-Stenman and Svedsäter
(2003) ﬁnd that people who are asked which attributes are most important to them in a car systematically put
environmental performance near the top and social status near the bottom; but when asked about the true
preferences of their neighbors or average compatriots, they give dramatically reversed rankings. Interviews with
car dealers show intermediate results.
2outcome (as with ﬁring squads, which always have one blank bullet), many choose not to know
and revert to selﬁsh choices. In a related vein, Murningham et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the fairness of
oﬀers in dictator games is signiﬁcantly decreased when the precision with which oﬀerers can split
the cake is decreased, allowing them to construe the outcomes as largely outside their control.5
In this paper, we examine the set of issues discussed above with a theory of prosocial behavior
that combines heterogeneity in individuals’ degrees of altruism and greed with a concern for
social reputation or self-respect. In other words, prosocial actions are undertaken both because
a certain fraction of individuals are genuinely other-regarding, and due to the fact that, in many
cases:
— people want to signal to others that they are generous, fair, public-spirited, disinterested,
courageous, etc. Prosocial behaviors are then part of a general quest for social esteem;
— people strive to maintain a certain view of “what kind of a person” they are. We use
here also a cognitive approach, based on psychologists’ ﬁndings that individuals commonly use
their own past behavior as “diagnostic” of their deep preferences. Conversely, they alter their
behavior with a view to its impact on the inferences they will later on make about themselves.
Underlying this self-signaling is the fact that the actions one has taken are more memorable
than their exact motivations.6
Our theory thus emphasizes the attributions made from individuals’ investments in identity-
building and demonstration goods, such as giving blood, contributing time or money to a charity,
or giving one’s life for familial honor or country. In particular, the crowding-out eﬀe c tt h a tw e
obtain is based on a very simple intuition: the presence of rewards or punishments spoils the
reputational (or self-reputational) value of good deeds, creating doubt as to the extent to which
they were performed for the incentives rather than for themselves. This eﬀe c ti si nl i n ew i t h
what psychologists refer to as the “overjustiﬁcation eﬀect” (e.g., Lepper et al. (1973)), to which
we give here a formal content in terms of a signal-extraction problem. It is also consistent with
the informal explanation provided by the designers of several of the experiments reported above;
for instance, Frey and Jegen (2001) state that
“An intrinsically motivated person is deprived of the chance of displaying his or her
own interest and involvement in an activity when someone else oﬀers a reward, or
orders him/her to do it”.
5A related set of classical ﬁndings in social psychology concerns attitudes towards victims. People who directly
directly witness abuse or injustice often tend to derogate the victims, unless they are able to either help the victim
or not feel any personal responsibility for his or her suﬀering (see, e.g., Batson (1998, p.296) or Lerner (1980)).
By trying to convince both themselves (often with the help of some form of self-deception) and others that the
victim would have derived only small beneﬁts from such help, or did not really deserve it, they seek to avoid the
adverse inferences about their character that not helping might otherwise generate.
6For more discussion, see Bodner and Prelec (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004). In psychology, the idea
that individuals take their actions as diagnostic of their preferences originated with Bem (1972), but it also relates
to cognitive dissonnance theory (Festinger and Carlsmith (1959)).
3The model also helps explain why it is often more eﬀective to contribute one’s time than
money (as with a parent trying to demonstrate her love or concern to a child), and allows us to
study the disclosure of information about one’s generosity, showing in particular how attempts
to buy social prestige may backﬁre. Other insights that emerge from an information-based
approach include the impact of observability to others and memorability to oneself, together
with key features of the distribution of intrinsic social preferences, on the emergence of multiple
social norms enforced by the interplay of honor and shame. Finally, an explicit treatment of the
signaling dimension of prosocial behavior also sheds light on the nature of competition among the
recipients of altruism (or their intermediaries) such as charities, NGO’s, arts groups, universities,
and similar non-proﬁt organizations. Donating to worthy causes is sometimes rewarded with
non-trivial “perks” such as preferred seating, meetings with famous performers, gala events which
also allow valuable social networking, or naming rights to a building, stadium or professorial
chair. In contrast to what would be predicted by standard Bertrand competition, we show that
fund-raisers competing for donations will not end up dissipating most the proceeds on such
incentives, due to what might be termed a “holier than thou” form of emulation. This same
eﬀect implies that sponsor competition can even reduce social welfare, by inducing agents to
engage in more ineﬃcient sacriﬁces.
The two papers most closely related to the present work are Bénabou and Tirole (2003)
and Seabright (2002). In our earlier work we developed an alternative (but similarly cognitive)
approach to the potential conﬂict between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, based on the idea
that giving an agent high-powered incentives may convey bad news about the nature of the task
or his ability, whenever the principal has private information about these variables. That the-
ory has natural applications to child-rearing, education, pay-for-performance and empowerment
versus monitoring of employees. It is much less relevant for incentives that are designed for large
groups and for activities —such as blood donations, voting, late arrivals at a day care center, or
contributing to a charitable cause— about which the principal seems unlikely to have superior
knowledge. In Seabright’s paper, as here, an individual’s direct beneﬁtf r o mc o n t r i b u t i n gt oa
“civic activity” depends on his private type. Agents then overinvest in this activity in order
to gain a reputation that will make them more desirable partners in a later matching market.
Most importantly, Seabright shows that if each agent sets his own price for participating in the
civic activity (subject to a cap set by some public authority), and if this price is constrained
to be non-negative, a “payment discontinuity”arises, whereby small rewards are never observed.
Intuitively, an individual is better oﬀ foregoing a small reward and pooling with the socially
desirable types who ask for none at all.
Other related papers include Bodner and Prelec (2003) and Bénabou and Tirole (2004) on
self-signaling, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) on identity, Brekke et al. (2003) on moral motiva-
tion, Denrell (1998) on credibility and compensation, Veblen (1899), Leibenstein (1950) and
Pesendorfer (1995) on ostentatious consumptions as signaling devices, and Bernheim (1994) on
4actions designed to signal conformity of tastes with others.7 As in Pesendorfer (1994), we build
on the idea that sponsors can exploit agents’ signaling concerns to their advantage. Finally, our
paper also ties in to the large literature on gifts and donations, such as Andreoni (1993) Glazer
and Konrad (1996), Harbaugh (1998) and Prendergast and Stole (2001).
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the model and Section II a ﬁrst,
intuitive illustration of the image-spoiling eﬀect of rewards. Section III then uses a Normal
signal-extraction speciﬁcation to demonstrate the crowding-out phenomenon, as well as related
forms of the overjustiﬁcation eﬀect. Section IV centers on the phenomenon of social norms,
explaining how multiple standards of socially or personally “acceptable” behavior arise from the
interplay of honor and stigma, and more generally identifying situations that make individual
participation decisions strategic complements or substitutes. Sections V and VI then turn to the
design of contracts, exploring respectively the case of a monopoly sponsor —including issues of
conﬁdentiality and disclosure— and that of sponsor competition, which is shown to cause rewards
to bid down rather than up, and to potentially reduce social welfare. Section VII concludes.
I The model
We study the behavior of agents (either a single individual or a large population) who must decide
on their participation in some prosocial activity: provision of a public good, contributing to a
worthy cause, engaging in a friendly or reciprocating action, refraining from imposing negative
externalities on others, etc. Each thus select a participation level a from some choice set A ⊂ R
that may be discrete (voting, blood donation) or continuous (time or money volunteered, fuel
eﬃciency of car purchased). Contributing entails a utility cost C(a) and yields a monetary or
material reward ya. The incentive rate y ≷ 0 may reﬂect a proportional subsidy or tax on a faced
by agents in this economy, or the fact that participation requires a monetary contribution.8 It
is set by a principal or “sponsor”, and for now we assume that agents take it as given.
Letting va and vy denote a typical agent’s intrinsic valuations for his own prosocial actions
and for money (consumption of market goods), participation at level a yields a direct net beneﬁt
(va + vyy)a − C(a). (1)
An individual’s preference type or “identity” v ≡ (va,v y) ∈ R2 is drawn from a continuous distri-
7Our work is also technically related to a small literature on signals that convey diverging news about diﬀerent
underlying characteristics. Thus Araujo et al. (2004) develop a model to reﬂect the evidence that the General
Educational Development (GED) dipoma signals both high cognitive skills and low non-cognitive skills.
8The latter case corresponds for instance to situations where a contribution of −y>0 dollars feeds a hungry
children, funds a artistic performances, etc. A higher “reward”, meaning a lower −y, may for example reﬂect a
higher matching rate by a sponsor or government.
5bution with density f (v), marginal densities g (va) and h(vy) and mean (¯ va, ¯ vy). Its realization
is private information, known to the agent when he decides how to act but not observable by
others.
a) Social signaling
In addition to these direct payoﬀs, actions also carry reputational costs or beneﬁts. In the
social signaling interpretation of the model these arise from interactions with the rest of society
—family, friends, colleagues, compatriots. The value of reputation may then be instrumental
(allowing the individual to match with more desirable partners, as in Denrell (1998), Gintis et
al. (2001) or Seabright (2002)), or purely hedonic (social esteem as a consumption good). Let x
denote the probability that the individual’s choice of a is observed by others, and ˆ f (v|a,y) the
posterior distribution of v conditional on (a,y). For simplicity, we assume that the (continuation)
value of reputation is a linear functional of ˆ f —that is, only expectations matter— with type-
independent coeﬃcients. The reputational payoﬀ from choosing a is thus9
x
£
γaE (va|a,y) − γyE (vy|a,y)
¤
, with γa ≥ 0 and γy ≥ 0. (2)
The signs of γa and γy reﬂect the idea that people would like to appear as prosocial (public-
spirited) and disinterested (not greedy). Deﬁning µa ≡ xγa and µy ≡ xγy, the overall utility of





(va + vyy)a − C(a)+µaE (va|a,y) − µyE (vy|a,y), (3)
which he will maximize over a ∈ A.10 In the basic version of the model, µ is taken to be common
to all agents, and thus public knowledge. Later on we shall allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in image-consciouness, with µ distributed independently of v according to a density m(µ).
b) Self-signaling and identity
The model also admits an important reinterpretation in terms of self-signaling. Suppose
that at the time he makes his decision, the individual engages in a self-assessment, or receives
some external signal about his type: “How important is it for me to contribute to the public
good? How much do I care about the money that I would then receive or forfeit? What are my
9This payoﬀ is deﬁned net of the constant (1 − x)

γa¯ va − γy¯ vy

, which corresponds to the case where a
remains unobserved. Note that a linear valuation of reputation also avoids building into agent’s preferences
either information-aversion (concave functional of ˆ f) or information-loving (convex functional of ˆ f.Naturally, the
expectations in (2) are also conditional on all publicly available information in addition to y.
10Agents may also care about the aggregate provision of the public good, but as long as it enters their preferences
separably it will not aﬀect their decisions or inferences, so we leave it out of (3). One could also easily incorporate
a form of “reciprocity” whereby a higher aggregate contribution ¯ a by other raises the individual’s intrinsic desire
to contribute —e.g., replace vaa by va(1+λ¯ a)a. While such a complementarity in payoﬀsi so f t e ni n v o k e dt oe x p l a i n
why people contribute more when they know that others do, we will show in Section IV that it is in fact not
required: in our information-based model, social norms of participation emerge endogenously.
6values?”. This self-assessment or signal, however, may not be perfectly recalled or “accessible”
later on —in fact, there will be strong incentives to remember it in a self-serving way. Actions, by
contrast, are much easier to quantify, record and remember than their underlying motivation,
making it rational for an agent to deﬁne himself partly through his past choices: “I am the
kind of person who behaves in this way”.11 Suppose therefore that the signal motivating the
participation decision is forgotten with probability x, and that later on the agent cares about his
self-image —that is, derives utility from his own beliefs concerning his type. This may reﬂect a
hedonic motive (people enjoy feeling generous or disinterested, e.g. Akerlof and Dickens (1987)
or Köszegi (2000)), an instrumental purpose (providing motivation to undertake and persevere
in long-term tasks or social relationships, e.g. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) or Bénabou and
Tirole (2002)), or both. If, for simplicity, this utility from self-image is linear in beliefs,with
weights γa and −γy on perceived social orientation and greediness, it is clear that the model is
formally equivalent to the social-signaling one.
II The image-spoiling eﬀect of rewards: basic intuitions
Should people be rewarded for performing good deeds or will this taint these acts, raising doubts
as to the true underlying motivation? We provide here a ﬁrst, intuitive illustration of this idea,
based on the observation that the presence of rewards changes the pool of participants.
We assume here, as in much of the paper, that the participation decision is binary: A = {0,1};
we then normalize C(0) = 0 and denote C(1) = ca. An individual therefore participates if
va − ca + vyy + R(y) ≥ 0, (4)
where
R(y) ≡ µa [E (va|1,y) − E (va|0,y)] − µy [E (vy|1,y) − E (vy|0,y)] (5)
is the net reputational gain (or loss) from participating, given that there is a monetary incentive
of y to do so. Note that R(y) is an equilibrium variable, but is type-independent.
The impact of incentives on participation is illustrated in Figure 1, for the case where va
and vy are independent variables, f (va,v y)=g(va)h(vy), while µa and µy are ﬁxed. Consider
ﬁrst the case in which no reward is oﬀered, y =0 . An agent then participates if and only if
va ≥ ca − R(0) ≡ v∗
a, so nothing is learned about vy and the participation rule is deﬁn e db ya
threshold for intrinsic motivation. To determine this value, let us deﬁne, for all va,






11For a model of, and psychological references on, the links between imperfect recall and self-signaling, see
Bénabou and Tirole (2004) or Battaglini et al. (2002). On self-signaling in a dual-self or dual-utility (decision
utility plus “diagnostic” utility) model, see Bodner and Prelec (2003).






The ﬁrst expression governs the “honor” conferred by participation, which is the diﬀerence
between M+ (va) and the unconditional expectation ¯ va. The second one governs the “stigma”
from abstention, which is M− (va) − ¯ va. Since both are nondecreasing functions of the (poten-
tial) cutoﬀ va, their diﬀerence M+ (va) − M− (va), which deﬁnes the net reputational eﬀect of
participation, may in general increase or decrease with va.12 The cutoﬀ for unpaid participation










assuming for the moment that Ψ is increasing, ensuring uniqueness (multiplicity will be consid-
ered later on).
L e tu sn o wi n t r o d u c ear e w a r dy>0; the reasoning would work in reverse for a ﬁne or
punishment y<0. As seen from (4) and illustrated in Figure 1, the indiﬀerence locus is now a
line with slope −1/y. Ignoring, in a ﬁrst step, changes in inference, participation expands, as
types in the hatched area (A + B) are drawn in. There are, however, two reputational eﬀects:
— The new participants have a lower valuation va for the public good than those who par-
ticipate in the absence of reward. The honor from choosing a =1thus declines, but so does the
stigma from choosing a =0 .13
— The new participants are greedy types (tend to be interested in money): E (vy|1,y) >
E (vy|1,0), which is always an adverse reputational eﬀect.
If the overall impact on reputation is negative, R(y) <R (0) a sd r a w ni nF i g u r e1a n de n s u r e d
by Proposition 1 below, the reward attracts some new participants (more greedy agents in area
B) but repels some existing ones (more public-spirited agents in area C).14 Overall, participation
may increase or decrease, depending on the weights given to B and C by the distribution f.
The next sections will identify situations in which net crowding out does occur. Clearly,
a necessary condition is that greater incentives depress the reputational value of participation,
R(y). Using a simple reasoning based on Figure 1, we can already ﬁnd conditions under which
this (weaker) eﬀect occurs when a reward is introduced, starting from a no-reward situation.
12For example, we have: M
+ − M
− ≡ 1/2 for g(va) ≡ 1 on [0,1]; more generally, if g(va)=( α +1 )v
α
a
on [0,1], with α>−1, then M
+ (va) − M








. This function is
increasing in va when α>0 (e.g., α =1 )and decreasing when −1 <α<0. (e.g., α = −1/2); see Proposition 7.
13Indeed, from the independence of the two variables, E (va | va + vyy + R(0) ≥ ca)=
Evy (Eva (va | va ≥− vyy + ca − R(0))) ≤ Evy (Eva (va | va ≥ ca − R(0))) = Eva (va | va ≥ v
∗
a), under the
very plausible assumption that vy is bounded below by zero.
14This is in line with Upton’s (1973) ﬁndings that oﬀering a monetary reward for giving blood led to reduced
donations by those who had regularly been giving for free, and increased donations from those who never had.
8no-reward condition () 0  y =
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Figure 1: the eﬀects of rewards on the pool of participants
Proposition 1 Assume that Ψ0 ≥ 0, where Ψ was deﬁned in (8), and that the lower bound of
agents’ valuation for money is v−
y =0 . Then, if µy =0 , or if va and vy are independent or neg-
atively aﬃliated, the introduction of a reward lowers the net reputational value of participation:
R(y) <R (0), for all y>0.
Proof: see the appendix.
Negative aﬃliation implies that the two posteriors about va and vy tend to be updated in
opposite directions, implying that agents who contribute only in response to external incentives
y>0 must pay a “double dividend” in terms of lost reputation. The condition Ψ0 ≥ 0 ensures
the uniqueness of the equilibrium (at least when µy =0or vy is known), and more generally
rules out the kind of strong complementarity between agents’ participation decisions that will
be extensively studied in Section IV.
III The overjustiﬁcation eﬀect and crowding out
We provide in this section a more explicit model of the image-spoiling eﬀect of rewards, in
which we also allow for variations in individuals’ degrees of image consciousness. The main
result is that the presence of stronger extrinsic incentives causes observers (or, in retrospect,
the individual himself) to attribute a smaller role to intrinsic motivation in explaining behavior;
this in turn, leads to a decreasing supply curve, under conditions that we identify. Formally, we
show how the “overjustiﬁcation eﬀect” discussed by psychologists can be understood as a simple
signal-extraction problem in which rewards amplify the noise, and thus crowd out reputational
motivation.
We allow here actions to vary continuously: a ∈ A = R, with a strictly convex cost C(a);
for technical reasons we also assume that as |a| → +∞,C (a) is asymptotically equivalent to
9a polynomial in a. The overall utility of an agent with preferences v ≡ (va,v y) and (self)




is still given by (3), but now both v and µ may vary across
individuals and are private information. Observers (or the individual in retrospect) only know
































, ¯ µa ≥ 0, ¯ µy ≥ 0 (10)
and the simplifying assumption that these two random variables are independently distributed.15
A Individual and aggregate responses to incentives
For an agent with type (v,µ), the optimal choice of a when the subsidy rate is y is determined
by the ﬁrst-order condition :
C0(a)=va + vyy + R(a,y), (11)








Consider now the inference problem of an external or (retrospective) internal observer. From
(11), the agent’s choice of a reveals the sum his three motivations to contribute (at the margin):
intrinsic, extrinsic, and reputational.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eµ is uncorrelated with v and the functions
E (va|a,y) and E (vy|a,y) are known in equilibrium,R(a,y) is independent of v, conditionally
on a. Reputational motivation thus acts as a heteroskedastic normal shock, with mean



























15As is often the case, normality yields great tractability at the cost of allowing certain variables to take
implausible negative values. By choosing the means large enough, however, one can make the probability of such
realizations arbitrarily small; but (9)-(10) should really be interpreted as local approximations, consistent with
the linearity of preferences assumed throughout the paper.
16In addition to (11), the second-order condition ∂R(a;y)/∂a ≤ C
00(a) must also hold. We focus throughout
this section on equilibria where the two components of reputation are twice-diﬀerentiable functions of a.
10Standard signal-extraction results for normal random variables then yield:
E (va|a,y)=¯ va + ρ(a,y) ·
¡
C0(a) − ¯ va − y · ¯ vy − ¯ R(a,y)
¢
, (14)
E (vy|a,y)=¯ vy + χ(a,y) ·
¡








a +2 yσay + y2σ2





a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y + Ω(a,y)2. (17)
Quite intuitively, the posterior assessment of an agent’s intrinsic motivation, E (va|a,y), is a
weighted average of the prior ¯ va and of the marginal cost of his observed contribution C0(a), net
of the average extrinsic and reputational incentives to contribute at that level.
An equilibrium is thus deﬁned as a solution to the system of nonlinear diﬀerential equations
(14)-(15) in E (va|a,y) and E (vy|a,y), such that the second-order condition also holds every-
where. This is in general a complicated problem, but we are able to solve it in an important class
of cases, namely that where the variance of the reputational incentive, Ω(a,y)2, is independent
of a. This means that either:
— all agents have the same reputational concerns, so that the covariance matrix of µ in (10)
is zero; or,
— the cost function C(a) is quadratic, leading to expectations E (va|a,y) and E (vy|a,y) and
ad i ﬀerential system that is linear in a.
These two cases are solved in Propositions 2 and 3 respectively.
Proposition 2 Let all agents have the same valuation (¯ µa, ¯ µy) for reputation, and denote
µ(y) ≡ ¯ µaρ(y) − ¯ µyχ(y), where ρ(y) and χ(y) are deﬁned by (16)-(17) with Ω ≡ 0. The op-




C0(a − µ(y)z) e−zdz = va + y · vy. (18)
The marginal reputations from contributing are ∂E(va|a,y)/∂a = ρ(y) ∂Γ(a,µ(y))/∂a and
∂E(vy|a,y)/∂a = χ(y)∂Γ(a,µ(y))/∂a, with a net value of ¯ R(a,y)=µ(y)∂Γ(a,µ(y))/∂a.
Proof: see the appendix.




C00(a − µ(y)z) e−zdz = va + y · vy (19)
11makes clear that Γ(a,µ(y)) can be interpreted as a reputation-adjusted marginal cost of contribut-
ing at the level a, a n da l l o w su st oa n a l y z et h ee ﬀects of incentives on individual’s behaviors and
inferences. On one hand, a higher y increases agents’ non-reputational motivation to contribute,
va + y · vy. On the other hand, it tends to reduce the value of a marginal contribution along















so a higher y acts very much like an increase in the noise-to-signal ratio θ ≡ σy/σa, leading
observers who seek to parse out the agent’s motives to decrease the weight given to social
orientation, ρ(y), and increase its counterpart for greediness, χ(y).17 Thus µ(y) falls, and this
lowers the reputational incentive to act prosocially, ¯ R(a,y), which is the second term in (19).
Simply put, extrinsic motivation crowds out reputational motivation.
A positive correlation between va and vy tends to amplify the decline in ρ(y), thereby ac-
centuating the overjustiﬁcation eﬀect; a negative σay works in reverse. Intuitively, the more
va and vy tend to move together, the less observing a higher contribution a = Γ−1 (va + vyy)
represents good news about the agent’s intrinsic valuation va; and the larger is y, the stronger
is this “discounting” eﬀect. For instance, as the correlation between va and vy rises from −1
to 0 to 1, the function ρ(y) pivots downwards over the range 0 <y<1/θ ,f r o m1/(1 − θy) to
1/(1 + θ2y2) a n dt h e nt o1/(1 + θy).18
The results in Proposition 2 can be made more speciﬁc when the cost function is quadratic:
with C(a)=ka2/2, individual supply (18) becomes
a =
va + y · vy
k
+¯ µaρ(y) − ¯ µyχ(y). (21)




+¯ µaρ0(y) − ¯ µyχ0(y), (22)
clearly reﬂecting the crowding out (or in) of reputational motivation by extrinsic incentives.
Corollary 1 (small incentives). Let C(a)=ka2/2, and assume that all agents have the same




















17More speciﬁcally, yχ(y)=1− ρ(y) rises with y everywhere, but the same is true of χ(y) only up to y =1 /θ.
For what follows, note that that the function µ∂Γ(a,µ)/∂a = C
0(a) − Γ(a,µ) is increasing in µ.
18Recall that θ ≡ σy/σa.T h ee ﬀect of σay on the slope of χ(y) is somewhat more complex, as it depends on
σ
2
ay. The exact formulas for ρ
0(y) and χ
0(y) are given in the proof of Corollary 1.
12Proof: see the appendix.
This case is interesting because some of the experimental evidence on crowding out ﬁnds
that these eﬀects occur mainly for relatively small rewards (see, e.g., Gneezy and Rusticchini
(2000 a,b)). Note also that the above condition may hold even when only one reputational
concern is operative (µa =0or µy =0 ) , as well as when va and vy are either positively or
negatively correlated (the latter case requires µy > 0). Suﬃciently large incentives, on the other
hand, always increase supply: as |y| → +∞,ρ (y) and χ(y) both tend to zero, so behavior is
dominated by the direct, non-reputational eﬀect.
Is crowding out only a “small-stakes” phenomenon? The answer is negative: some of the
studies reviewed earlier ﬁnd such an eﬀect even with fairly substantial incentives (e.g., Fehr and
Gächter (2000), Bohnet et al. (2001)), and our model shows that it can in fact be intermediate-
sized rewards that have paradoxical eﬀects.
Corollary 2 (intermediate incentives). Let C(a)=ka2/2 and Ω ≡ 0. Let va and vy be
uncorrelated, and let θ ≡ σy/σa. Incentives are counterproductive, ¯ a0(y) < 0, whenever
¯ vy
k
< ¯ µa ·
2yθ2
¡





Consequently: (i) if ¯ µyθ2 < ¯ vy/k, then for all ¯ µa above some threshold µ∗
a > 0 there exist
an interval of prices [y1,y 2] with 0 <y 1 <y 2, such that ¯ a(y) is decreasing on [y1,y 2] and
increasing everywhere else on R. As ¯ µa rises, y1 decreases and y2 increases, so that [y1,y 2]
widens; conversely, this is interval becomes empty as µa falls below µ∗
a.
(ii) if ¯ µyθ2 > ¯ vy/k, there exists an interval [y0
1,y 1] with y0
1 < 0 <y 1 such that, for all ¯ µa ≥ 0, ¯ a(y)
is decreasing on [y0
1,y 1] a n di n c r e a s i n ge v e r y w h e r ee l s eo nR.
Proof: see the appendix.
Since a number of experimental studies seem to ﬁnd a “discontinuity at zero” in subjects’
response to rewards,19 it may be worth commenting on the fact that in our model individual
behavior is always continuous, whether or not crowding out occurs. This reﬂects the fact that
agents make very ﬁne inferences based on the precise size of the reward and optimal (Bayesian)
ﬁltering rules, which admittedly represents greater cognitive sophistication than most individuals
actually have, or ﬁnd worthwhile to apply in one-shot experimental situations. If people use
in fact a more “coarse” ﬁlter, such as broadly classifying situations into “unrewarded”, “small
reward” and “large reward” categories, the crowding-out results arising from the mechanism we
identify will also result in a discontinuities, particularly at the origin.
19See, e.g., Gneezy and Rusticchini (2003). One should note, however, that these studies typically involve only
at most two or three data points (reward rates) to the right or left of zero, making it hard to identify exactly
where the supply curve bottoms out.
13B Prominence, memorability and publicity
Intuition suggests that participation in good causes will be enhanced if it is more conspicuous,
n a m e l yi ft h ec o n t r i b u t i o ni sm o r el i k e l yt ob en o t iced by others (social signaling) or the individ-
ual more likely to be reminded of it (self-signaling). Indeed, public authorities and other sponsors
make heavy use of both public displays and private mementos conveying honor or stigma. Na-
tions award medals and honoriﬁc titles, charitable organizations send donors pictures of “their”
sponsored child, non-proﬁts give bumper stickers and T-shirts with logos, universities award
“diplomas” rather than signiﬁcant cash prizes to professors delivering special lectures, etc.20
Conversely, the ancient practice of the pillory has been updated in the form of televised arrests
and, in some states and towns, publishing the names of parents who are delinquent on child
support or the licence plate numbers of cars photographed in areas known for drug traﬃcking or
prostitution. Peer eﬀects also play an important role in boosting contributions, as they create a
rehearsal mechanism: if acquaintances all contribute to a cause, one is constantly reminded of
one’s generosity, or lack thereof. Relatedly, people volunteer more help in response to a request
to do so, especially when it comes from a friend, a colleague or family (Freeman 1997), whose
opinion of them they naturally care about more than that of strangers.





. Our model then conﬁrms the above intuitions, but also delivers some
important, and empirically relevant, caveats. First, when the existing structure of rewards
and punishments is such that the (marginal) reputational return to participation is actually
negative, an increase in visibility naturally tends to reduce rather than increase participation.
Second, and more subtly, when there is heterogeneity in image-consciousness, giving increased
prominence or scrutiny to individual’s decisions may backﬁre (at least partially), as good actions
come to be suspected of being image-motivated. Our model thus brings to light a new form of
the overjustiﬁcation eﬀect, linked not to material incentives but to image-related ones.
We analyze these issues using the quadratic-cost speciﬁcation, which allows the model to be
solved when image concerns as well as goods valuations diﬀer across agents.
Proposition 3 Let the cost of contributing be quadratic, C(a)=ka2/2.21 Each agent’s optimal
action a is then deﬁned by
a =
va + y · vy
k
+ µaρ(y) − µyχ(y), (23)
20Potters et al. (2001, 2002) explain (experimentally) charities’ frequent strategy of publicly announcing “lead-
ership” contributions, and the higher yields achieved when donors act sequentially rather than simultaneously,
b yas i g n a l i n ge ﬀect about the quality of the public good. They show in particular that this explanation works
better than one based on “reciprocating” the generosity of early donors. A complementary explanation could be
donors’ desire to signal, socially and to themselves, how generous and public-spirited they are.
21We also focus attention here on equilibria where the expectations E (va|a,y) and E (vy|a,y) are linear in a.
While this requires that costs be quadratic, and conversely quadratic costs naturally lead to such a solution for
(14)-(15), even with C(k)=ka
2/2 one cannot rule out a priori the existence of other, nonlinear, solutions.





The marginal reputations from contribution are ∂E(va|a,y)/∂a = ρ(y)k and ∂E(vy|a,y)/∂a =
χ(y)k, with a net value of R(y)=( µaρ(y) − µyχ(y))k.
Proof: see the appendix.
These results demonstrate in particular how a greater variability of image concerns, Ω(y)2 =
Va r(R(y)), makes individuals’ behavior a more noisy measure of their true underlying val-
ues (va,v y), reducing both ρ(y) and χ(y). This variance it itself endogenous, however, as
reputation-motivated agents take account of how their collective behavior aﬀects observers’
signal-extraction-problem; this is reﬂected in the ﬁxed-point equation.22
Proposition 3 also allows us to formalize the idea, mentioned above, that increased promi-
nence gives rise to an oﬀsetting overjustiﬁcation eﬀect. Indeed, let all reputational weights
µ =( µa,µ y)’s be scaled up by some factor x —not necessarily a probability: x could also reﬂect
the number of future periods during which the “record” of the agent’s behavior will be kept,
or the number of people who will hear about it. The material incentive y remains constant.
Aggregate supply is now
¯ a(y,x)=




¯ µaρ(y,x) − ¯ µyχ(y,x)
¢
,







point equation (24) deﬁning Ω(y,x) are now multiplied by x2. As a result, Ω(y,x) is increasing
in x,23 and ρ(y,x) and χ(y,x) consequently decrease with x. Intuitively, a greater visibility of
actions and the rewards attached to them has two oﬀsetting eﬀects on the reputational incentive
to invest:
— a direct amplifying eﬀect, the sign of which is that of µaρ(y,x)−µyχ(y,x) for an individual
and ¯ µaρ(y,x) − ¯ µyχ(y,x) on average. For people who are mostly concerned about appearing
socially-minded (µa is large relative to µy) this increases the incentive to act in a prosocial
manner, whereas for those most concerned about not appearing greedy (µy is large relative to
µa) it has the reverse eﬀect.24
22We show in the proof of Proposition 3 that there always exists a solution to (24), and that it is unique when
ωay =0 . When ωay 6=0there might be multiple equilibria, with diﬀerent degrees of informativeness. Since the
general theme of multiplicity is investigated in Section IV.B, we do not pursue it here.
23This is clear from (24) in the case where ωay =0 , but we show in the appendix that it holds more generally
in any stable equilibrium.
24We are focussing here, for illustrative purposes only, on the “natural” case where ρ and χ are both positive,
which occurs unless σay is very negative; see (16)-(17).
15— a dampening eﬀect, as reputation along both dimensions becomes less sensitive to the
individual’s behavior, which observers increasingly ascribe to image concerns. Formally, ρ(y,x)
and χ(y,x) take lower values.
This tradeoﬀ implies that publicity for good or bad actions may be of somewhat limited
eﬀectiveness, even when it is relatively cheap to provide. Consider for instance the case where
agents are concerned only about their reputation with respect to va (more generally, ωy =0 ) ;









Since the aggregate social beneﬁt from publicity ¯ µaxρ(y,x) grows with x only as x1/3, it will be
optimal to provide only a ﬁnite level even when x can be increased at a constant marginal cost,
or even a marginal cost that declines slower than x−2/3.25
A policy by the government or other sponsors to increase the public visibility of individuals’
pro- or anti-social behavior is thus, in sense, self-limiting. In Section V.B.2 we shall demonstrate
how a similar phenomenon may lead individuals who have the option to publicly disclose their
good deeds to refrain from doing so, for fear of appearing driven by personal vanity or a quest
for social image.
IV Honor, stigma, and social norms
In this section we derive further results on the interactions between the intrinsic, extrinsic and
reputational motives for prosocial behavior. We ﬁrst present an alternative mechanism through
w h i c hr e w a r d sm a yb a c k ﬁre, due the presence of costs of participation; we also examine contribu-
tions in kind versus cash. We next turn to the issue of norms, explaining how multiple standards
of socially or personally “acceptable” behavior can be sustained, and what characteristics of the
“market” facilitate or impede their emergence.26 We revert from here on to the case of discrete
actions, A = {0,1}, in which the notions of honor and stigma are most sharply apparent.
A Signal reversal and crowding out
We analyze here settings in which as the reward grows, participation may come to be interpreted
as a signal of greed rather than one of high-mindedness, creating a crowding-out eﬀect.
a) Participation involves an income opportunity cost
25On the other hand there cannot be complete crowding out, namely xρ(y,x) actually decreasing with x :
otherwise, by (16) and (24) ρ(y,x) would be increasing in x, a contradiction.
26The source of both sets of results diﬀers from the “signal-garbling” eﬀect of the previous section, as there is
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Figure 2: crowding out through signal reversal (vyv U[0,1], −¯ y<c a−va−µy/2 < 0 <c a−va+µy/2)
Suppose that va is known, while vy is not. Furthermore, contributing —volunteering, helping,
voting, behaving honestly— entails an opportunity cost (foregone earnings or opportunistic gains)
with monetary value ¯ y . An agent then participates if and only if
va − ca + vy (y − ¯ y)+R(y) ≥ 0, (26)
where R(y)=−µy [E (vy|1,y) − E (vy|0,y)]. We are thus led to consider two cases:
— Low-reward condition:f o ry<¯ y, greedy types do not contribute; only those with vy below
ac u t o ﬀ v∗
y do, where v∗
y (when interior) is given by
va − ca + v∗











— High-reward condition:f o ry>¯ y, participation is a signal of greed; only those with vy above
ac u t o ﬀ v∗
y do it, where v∗
y (when interior) is now given by:
va − ca + v∗











Figure 2 describes the participation rate as a function of the reward for a uniform density of
vy on [0,1], under which M+ −M− ≡ 1/2. Participation jumps down at y =¯ y (crowding out):
at that point, it becomes a “proﬁtable” activity and therefore switches from being a source of
reputational gain to a source of loss. The supply curve rises again with y beyond this threshold,
and a high enough reward ultimately attracts the whole population.
Proposition 4 (signal reversal). Opportunity costs may induce signal reversal and a con-
comitant crowding out of participation by monetary incentives.
Remark (perfect negative correlation). Suppose now that va and vy are unknown but perfectly
17negatively correlated, so that a public-spirited individual is also disinterested: va = κ − ¯ yvy.
Denoting the slope as ¯ y facilitates the comparison with the previous case. Indeed, given a
reputational beneﬁt R(y),an agent participates if and only if
va − ca + vyy + R(y)=κ−ca + vy (y − ¯ y)+R(y) ≥ 0, (27)
so that this case is mathematically identical to the opportunity-cost model just analyzed.
b) Cash donations versus volunteering
Let agents now diﬀer not only in their valuation vy for money, but also in their opportunity
costs (¯ yi for individual i). We assume that the same reward y is oﬀered to everyone, as the
sponsor cannot discriminate and oﬀer diﬀerent payments to diﬀerent people. The target audience
for signaling (self, family, friends, colleagues,...), by contrast, knows the individual’s opportunity
cost. We focus, for simplicity, on the case where ¯ yi and vy are independent; in practice they
may be correlated, for instance through the individual’s level of income. The nature of the
participation decision is depicted in Figure 3.
Proposition 5 (volunteering).
(i) Individuals with a high opportunity cost of time may volunteer more than others with the
same valuation for the public good but a lower opportunity cost of their time.
(ii) (Wrong currency). When faced with the choice of whether to contribute in cash or in kind
(volunteering), an individual with a low hourly wage may contribute in cash, while another with
a higher hourly wage may volunteer time.
Proof: (i) Take two individuals, i and j, such that ¯ yi <y<¯ yj. Participating is a signal of
greed for i and of lack of greed for j. So from Figure 2 we know that individual j will participate
more than individual i ( i . e . ,f o raw i d e rr a n g eo fvy’s), at least if ¯ yi and ¯ yj are close enough to y.
(ii) Individuals are now given the choice between contributing y in cash and volunteering b =1
unit of time for the cause, with opportunity cost ¯ yi for agent i; the payoﬀsa r eva − ca − vyy −
µyE (vy|a =1 ,y) and va −ca −vy¯ yi −µyE (vy|b =1 ,y) respectively. If ¯ yi >y ,then as the value
for money grows the individual prefers ﬁrst contributing in kind, then in cash, and last not
contributing at all.27 Similarly, for ¯ yj just below y, individuals with wage ¯ yj contribute cash. ¥
c) Choice of currency
Some rewards are non-monetary and therefore would seem to be highly ineﬃcient.28 Our
basic model already captures an obvious ﬁrst rationale for such rewards: to the extent that these
27The second interval is degenerate (no one in group i contributes in cash) if and only if v
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, where va − ca − v
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=0deﬁnes the cut-oﬀ v
i
y for participa-
tion in the group with wage ¯ yi.
28Other arguments have been proposed recently to explain the existence of non-monetary transfers in other
contexts. Prendergast and Stole (2001) explain why gifts are usually in kind rather than in cash with a model in
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Figure 3: contributing in kind and in cash
are tied to a particular deed, they are more memorable for the self and more revealing to others
than money, which is highly fungible. Proposition 5 provides a second motive: to signal their
commitment, individuals with a high opportunity cost of their time may do voluntary work,
while those with a lower opportunity cost may contribute cash.
“Ineﬃcient currencies” may also be desirable for sponsors because they are valued diﬀerently
by diﬀerent types. For example, a teaching award or a nice dinner with students is worth more
to a committed teacher. The opportunity to attend special events at the opera or mingle with
artists has a higher value to a true friend of the arts (see Busraschi and Cornelli (2002) for related
evidence). Screening agents through the use of such non-monetary rewards can be particularly
valuable when the sponsor is in search of high-quality participation (see Section V.A).
B Endogenous social norms
What makes a given behavior socially or morally unacceptable is often the very fact that “it is
just not done”, meaning that only people whose extreme types make them social outliers would
not be dissuaded by the intense shame attached to it. In other places or times diﬀerent norms
or codes of honor prevail, and the fact that “everyone does it” allows the very same behavior
to be free of all stigma. Examples include choosing surrender over death, not going to church,
not voting, divorce, bankruptcy, unemployment, welfare dependency, minor tax evasion, and
conspicuous modes of consumption.29
which donors diﬀer in their degree of certainty about what the recipient prefers. Provided that donors suﬀer when
giving a bad gift, those with high certainty can signal themselves by taking the risk of giving in kind. In Friebel
and Guriev (2002), ﬁrms that are local monopsonists in the labor market pay their workers in kind in order to
prevent the latter from accumulating enough money and moving (or threatening to move).
29The socially determined nature of norms is heavily emphasized by psychologists (e.g. Batson (1998)) and
sociologists. Multiple equilibria also arise from (very diﬀerent) reputational concerns in Bernheim’s (1994) model
of conformity.
19We show here how complementarities between agents’ choices arise endogenously through
the inferences made from observed behaviors, creating the potential for multiple norms of social
responsibility. In particular, no assumption of complementarity in payoﬀs (e.g., between va and
aggregate donations, representing a form of “reciprocity”) is required to explain the common
ﬁnding that individuals contribute more to public goods when they know that others are also
giving more. For simplicity we focus here on the case where vy is known (vy ≡ 1), while va is
distributed on some interval [v−
a ,v+
a ]. An agent then participates if
va + y − ca + µa [E (va|1,y) − E (va|0,y)] ≥ 0,
meaning that va is above a threshold deﬁned by comparing the net cost of participation, ca −y,
with the same function Ψ(va) as in Section II,
Ψ(va) ≡ va + µa
£
M+ (va) − M− (va)
¤
≡ va + R(va), for all va ∈ [0,1]. (28)
The following properties follow directly.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium set depends on the monotonicity properties of Ψ(v)=v+R(v).
i) When Ψ is increasing, there is a unique equilibrium. If ca −y ∈ (Ψ(v−
a ),Ψ(v+
a )), the cutoﬀ is
interior and deﬁned by Ψ(v∗
a)=ca −y;i fca −y<Ψ(v−
a ), it is v∗
a = v−
a (full participation) and
if ca − y>Ψ(v+
a ), it is v∗
a = v+
a (no participation)
(ii) When Ψ is decreasing and ca −y ∈ (Ψ(v+
a ),Ψ(v−





a (no participation) and the interior cutoﬀ deﬁned by Ψ(v∗
a)=ca−y; this
last equilibrium, however, is unstable (in the usual tâtonnement sense). If Ψ is decreasing and
ca − y/ ∈ (Ψ(v+
a ),Ψ(v−
a )) there is unique equilibrium, located at a boundary.
(iii) When Ψ is non-monotonic, there exists a range of values of ca − y for which there are at
least two stable equilibria, of which one at least is interior.
We provide two examples.
a) Upward sloping supply. Let va be uniform on [0,1]. Then Ψ(va) ≡ va + µa/2, so the supply
curve ¯ a(y) ≡ Pr(va ≥ v∗




























Figure 4b: multiple equilbria
20b) Multiple equilibria. Let va be distributed on [0,1] density g (va)=2 va. Then Ψ(va) ≡
va +( 2 µa/3)(1 + va)
−1 is decreasing for µa > 6, resulting in three equilibria as in Figure 4b.
For µa ∈ (3/2,6), Ψ is hump-shaped, making the high-participation equilibrium interior.
As explained below, the general intuition for these results is that Ψ0 < 0, or, equivalently,
R0 < −1, corresponds to a (strong) form of strategic complementarity.
C Sources of strategic complementarity
In what follows, we maintain the assumption that vy is known but va is not.
Deﬁnition Participation decisions exhibit strategic complementarities if R
0
(va) < 0 for all va.
When R0 = µa(M+ − M−)0 < 0, a wider participation (dva < 0) worsens the pool of
abstainers more than that of contributors, so that the stigma from abstention M− (va) − ¯ va
rises faster than the honor from participation M+ (va)− ¯ va fades. When R0 < −1, the increase
in the net reputational pressure is strong enough that the marginal agents in [v∗
a − dva,v∗
a],
who initially preferred to abstain, now feel compelled to contribute. This further increases
participation and conﬁnes abstention to an even worse pool, etc., leading to corner solutions as
the only stable equilibria, as in Figure 4b. When R0 ∈ (−1,0) complementarity is weak enough
that the marginal agents still prefer to stay out, hence stability obtains; this is a fortiori the
case when there is susbtitutability, R0 > 0.
Equipped with these results and intuitions, we now investigate the main factors that make
strategic complementarity —and thus the existence of socially determined norms— more likely.
C.1 Increasing density
An increasing density g(va) makes it more likely that M+−M− is declining: a rise in va hardly
increases E (va |˜ va ≥ va) but substantially increases E (va |˜ va ≤ va), since the weight reallocated
at the margin is small relative to that in the upper tail, but large relative to that in the lower
tail. This intuition is conﬁrmed by the (more general) next two propositions.
Proposition 7 (Jewitt 2004). If the distribution of va has a density which (on its support)
is (a) decreasing, (b) increasing, (c) unimodal, then M+ (va) − M− (va) is respectively (a)
increasing, (b) decreasing, (c) quasi convex.
Proposition 7 provides a suﬃcient condition for the monotonicity of M+ − M−. What
ultimately matters for uniqueness or multiplicity and the slope of of the supply curve, however,
is the behavior of Ψ(va)=va+µa [M+ (va) − M− (va)]. So the second requirement for multiple
equilibria is that reputational concerns be strong enough: µa must be suﬃciently high.
The following proposition provides a suﬃcient condition (weaker than (a) above) for supply
to be uniquely deﬁned and increasing in price. No simple analogue is available for the converse
case.
21Proposition 8 If the distribution of va has a log-concave density g, or more generally a log-
concave distribution function G, then for all µa ∈ [0,1] the supply function is everywhere upward-
sloping.
Proof: We can write:
va + µa
£
M+ (va) − M− (va)
¤
= va − M− (va)+µaM+ (va)+( 1− µa)M− (va),
and observe that both M+and M− are increasing functions, while




is also increasing in va, provided the integral of G is log-concave. As shown for instance in Caplin
and Nalebuﬀ (1991), log-concavity is preserved by integration over convex sets, so it suﬃces that
G itself be log-concave (g/G decreasing, which is weaker than g decreasing as in Proposition
7(a) above). In turn, a suﬃcient condition for this is that g be log-concave. ¥
C . 2 E x c u s e sa n df o r c e dp a r t i c i p a t i o n
We have so far assumed that observers (future “self”, other agents) know for sure that the
individual had an opportunity to contribute. This is often not the case. On one hand, the in-
dividual may have faced (unobserved or imperfectly remembered) circumstances that precluded
participation: not being informed, having to deal with some emergency, etc. By lessening the
stigma from abstention, such excuses will tend to inhibit the emergence of strategic complemen-
tarities. Conversely, with some probability a participating agent may have done the right thing
for reasons other than public-mindedness: the opportunity cost could have been unusually low,
or strong social pressure or extrinsic incentives may have induced forced behavior. By tarnish-
ing the “distinction” from performing the prosocial action, this will facilitate the emergence of
strategic complementarities. We look at these two possibilities in sequence.
• Involuntary non-participation
Suppose that with probability δ ∈ [0,1], an individual is unable to participate. For a given
potential cutoﬀ va the information conveyed by participation is unchanged, while that conveyed




δ¯ va +( 1− δ)G(va)M− (va)
δ +( 1− δ)G(va)
=
M+ (va) − ¯ va
1 − (1 − δ)[1− G(va)]
.











M+ (va) − ¯ va
and the last term is clearly decreasing in va.
• Forced participation
Conversely, suppose that with probability δ ∈ [0,1], an individual is forced to contribute.
The information conveyed by non-participation is unchanged, but the positive signal conveyed




δ¯ va +( 1− δ)[1− G(va)]M+ (va)
δ +( 1− δ)[1− G(va)]
− M− (va)=
¯ va − M− (va)
1 − (1 − δ)G(va)
.
It can similarly be shown that if
¡
MP − MNP¢0 (va;δ) < 0 it is also negative for all δ0 >δ .
Proposition 9 An increase in the probability of (unobserved) forced participation facilitates the
emergence of strategic complementarities, whereas an increase in the probability of (unobserved)
involuntary non-participation inhibits it.
A related set of factors involve the observability to others and memorability to himself of
the agent’s actions. If participation is observed but non-participation can go undetected (or be
forgotten) with some probability δ or, conversely, if antisocial behavior is detected for sure while
a good deed may go unnoticed with some probability δ0, this will lead to eﬀects qualitatively
similar to those just analyzed. We already discussed in Section IV.A the role of peers and kin
in raising the visibility and memorability of both pro and anti-social deeds. Combining this
observation with the above results makes it easy to understand the emergence of group-speciﬁc
norms of social responsibility.
V Equilibrium contracts
A Sponsor’s choice of reward
Sponsors, whether private or public, derive beneﬁts from agents’ participation but face resource
costs in oﬀering rewards. Let B denote the ratio between the monetary value of the beneﬁtt h a t
participation by each agent confers to a sponsor, and the latter’s opportunity cost of funds. A
monopoly sponsor thus solves (possibly after an equilibrium selection, as in Figure 4b)
max
y {(B − y)¯ a(y)},
where ¯ a(y)=
R
R4 a(v,µ; y)f (v)m(µ) dv dµ is the aggregate supply response to an oﬀer of
y, computed in previous sections under alternative assumptions on the distribution of agents’
23types (v,µ). Naturally, rewards that lead to net crowding out, ¯ a0(y) < 0, are never optimal for
the sponsor. A more surprising result is the following one.
Proposition 10 Let va be unknown, vy ≡ 1, and assume that Ψ0 > 0. A monopoly sponsor may
oﬀer contributors a reward that is too high from the point of view of social welfare.
Proof: see the appendix.
The normalization vy =1allows us here to add up the sponsor’s proﬁt and individuals’
surpluses to obtain aggregate welfare, while Ψ0 > 0 yields a unique cutoﬀ v∗
a(y) and upward-
sloping supply function ¯ a(y)=1−G(v∗
a(y)). To understand the intuition for the result, consider
the eﬀect of a marginal decline in the reward from the monopolist’s preferred level. By deﬁnition,
this has a negligible (ﬁrst-order) eﬀect on his proﬁt, so the welfare impact falls on the agents.
On the one hand, the ¯ a(y) inframarginal contributors receive lower rewards. On the other hand,
g(v∗
a(y)(−v∗0
a (y)) = g(v∗
a(y))/Ψ0(v∗
a(y) individuals at the margin stop contributing, and in doing
so they bring up the reputation (the average va) of both contributors and non-contributors.
By the martingale property, these gains corresponds to the marginal agents’ reputational loss,
which is µa [M+ (v∗
a) − M− (v∗














a is evaluated at the monopolist’s optimum, the reputational externality dominates the
transfer eﬀect, and oﬀering less generous rewards would increase aggregate welfare.
• Quality of participation.
Sponsors often care about “high-quality” participation, not just total enrollment. This arises
when actual participation is an open-ended contract, subject to adverse selection or moral haz-
ard. Thus, one argument for low pay to the military or no pay for volunteers is that one wants
to select, respectively, patriots and do-gooders, rather than people whose main loyalty is to
money. Implicitly, there is an opportunity cost in “recruiting” an agent –either the use of some
complementary capital, or the risk that the might end up harming the principal’s objectives
(e.g., mercenaries ﬁnding out that the enemy pays better). Similarly, it is often argued that not
paying people for blood reduces the fraction of donors with hepatitis.
For instance, if we introduce a hidden action (beyond a ∈ A, which is observed) whose
marginal cost to the individual decreases with va, we obtain, in reduced form, a beneﬁtf o rt h e
sponsor B (va) with B0 > 0 (more generally, B could depend on all of (v,µ)). The theory is





(B (va) − y)a(v,µ; y)f (v)m(µ) dv dµ
¾
.
24Building on this basic setup, we will now examine a number of issues concerning the nature
of equilibrium contracts and resulting participation rates. Until Section V.B, we shall assume
that there is no variability in µ.
• Menus.
We have assumed that the sponsor makes a single oﬀer. There is clearly no point in oﬀering
multiple rewards if the audience the agent signals to does not observe which one is selected, or
if side-contracting between the sponsor and the agent is feasible. Ignoring this, would a menu
be desirable for the sponsor?
Proposition 11 (menus). (i) Suppose that an individual’s marginal valuation va is unknown,
whereas vy is known and common to all agents. Then, menus cannot beneﬁt the sponsor.
(ii) Suppose that an individual’s marginal utility for money vy is unknown, whereas va is known
and common to all agents. Assume also that the distribution of vy satisﬁes the monotone hazard
rate property: h(vy)/(1 − H(vy)) is increasing in vy. Then a monopoly sponsor ﬁnds it optimal
to separate the types who contribute, using a menu with a continuum of rewards.
Proof: (i) Suppose that va is unknown and consider any menu of rewards Y. Conditionally
on contributing, the agent chooses y ∈ Y so as to maximize va − ca + vyy + µaE (va|a,y). The
optimal choice is independent of va, so the sponsor cannot screen the agent.
(ii) The proof that it is always optimal for the sponsor to separate types when vy is unknown
is provided in the appendix. Consider therefore a fully separating menu Y = {Y (˜ vy)},w h e r e
˜ vy is the agent’s announcement of his type and Y some strictly monotonic function. The agent
then chooses ˜ vy so as to maximize va − ca + vyY (˜ vy) − µy˜ vy. Taking derivatives and using the
truthtelling condition (˜ vy = vy in equilibrium) easily yields
Y (vy)=µy logvy + constant. (30)
Intuitively, a greedy agent has a high marginal rate of substitution between money and repu-
tation, so it makes sense for the sponsor to reward such types with money (associated with a
calamitous image) and a less greedy ones with a better reputation (and less money). ¥
• Should the fee remain conﬁdential?
We have assumed that the fee y is public. What would conﬁdentiality imply for sponsors
and agents? To examine this question, we use the same model with unknown va’s, and vy ≡ 1,
and assume R0 > −1 (or Ψ0 > 0, see Proposition 6) to avoid a multiplicity of equilibrium
participation rates. We consider a sponsor who can commit to one of two policies: conﬁdentiality
(C), under which only the agent knows the level of y oﬀered (but participation is publicly
observable), or public disclosure (D). In both cases we assume that the sponsor’s objective
function is quasiconcave in y.











≡ 0. If the sponsor secretly deviates and oﬀers y,





will contribute, since the reputational impact of action or
inaction remains unchanged. The sponsor therefore faces the ex-post supply curve
¯ aC(y)=1− G
¡






and chooses y to maximize πC(y) ≡ ¯ aC(y)(B − y). The equilibrium fee yC is then deﬁned by
π0
C(yC)=0 .
Public disclosure. The diﬀerence is that the fee is now credibly announced, and therefore aﬀects
the reputational value of contributions. For any y that is selected, agents with va above the
cutoﬀ v∗
a(y) deﬁned by v∗
a(y)−ca+y+R(v∗
a(y)) ≡ 0 contribute, so the sponsor faces the ex-ante
supply curve
¯ aD(y)=1− G(ca − y − R(v∗
a(y))) (32)
and chooses y to maximize πD(y) ≡ ¯ aD(y)(B − y). The equilibrium fee yD is then deﬁned by
π0
D(yD)=0 .
Proposition 12 (i) It is optimal for the sponsor to publicly disclose the fee.
(ii) With strategic complements (R0 < 0) the sponsor oﬀers a higher fee and elicits a higher
participation under disclosure than under public conﬁdentiality. The reverse holds for strategic
substitutes (R0 > 0).
(iii) The optimal reward under disclosure yD is immune to secret renegotiation between the
sponsor and the agent when R0 < 0. By contrast, when R0 > 0, the equilibrium reward when
secret renegotiation is feasible is yC.
Proof: see the appendix.
Intuitively, under public disclosure (but not conﬁdentiality) strategic complementarity creates
a “bandwagon eﬀect” that raises the slope of the supply curve, and therefore makes announcing
higher fees proﬁtable. Ex-post, the participants would not agree to a secret lowering of the fee,
so this eﬀect is renegociation-proof. Strategic substitutability has the converse eﬀect on supply
and thus leads to lower announced fees; but in this case both the sponsor and the participants
would agree to increase them ex-post, if they could ﬁnd ways of doing it secretly.
B Active signaling by the agent
It has so far been assumed that agents take their environment (reward, prominence of their
actions, etc.) as given, and just decide on their level of participation. Yet there are many
situations in which an individual plays a more active role in shaping his signaling problem.
26F i r s t ,e v e ni ft h er e w a r di ss e tb yt h es p o n s o r ,t h ea g e n tm a yb ea b l et or e f u s ea l lo rp a r to fi t .
Second, he may make his contribution more or less conspicuous.
B.1 Turning down rewards
An agent may be eager to participate in order to demonstrate his high-mindedness, but concerned
that the reputational beneﬁt will be tainted by an inference that money played a role in the
decision. So even when the sponsor oﬀers y, the agent could turn down part or all of the
reward (assuming y>0), or even complement his participation (such as giving blood) with a
net monetary contribution. Is this possibility damaging to the crowding-out argument?
Note ﬁrst that the issue may just not arise if give-backs are not observable by those to whom
the agent is trying to signal, or if the sponsor can reward the agent secretly. As shown earlier,
when R0 < 0 the principal and the agent may indeed collude ex-post to raise the reward above
what was publicly announced.
Suppose now that the realized transfer from the sponsor to the agent is eﬀectively observed
by others. When the uncertainty is about va, the net reputational gain from participating for










The agent therefore cannot signal his type by turning down all or any part of the reward, or even
giving money to the sponsor: the loss of monetary income, vy (y − y0), and the net reputational
beneﬁt, R(y0) − R(y), are both type independent.
Proposition 13 The equilibria studied in Sections II.B and II.C are still equilibria of the en-
larged game in which the individual can turn down part or all of the reward, if either transfers
from the sponsor are secret or if the uncertainty is about va.30
By contrast, when the uncertainty is (also) about vy, turning down the reward or part of
it could be used to signal the absence of greed. Yet even in this case, as we shall now see, it
may be that, in equilibrium, all agents either just accept y or do not participate, but never turn
down some of the reward. The intuition is that doing so could lead the audience to question the
agent’s motivation along another dimension: is he genuinely disinterested, or merely concerned
about his social (or self) image? It is thus linked to the general idea that good deeds that are
“too obvious” may backﬁre, which was ﬁrst encountered when studying public prominence in
Section III.B, and will recur again when examining private disclosure in the next subsection.
30It can also be veriﬁed that these equilibria satisfy the Cho-Kreps (1987) Never-a-Weak-Best-Response
(NWBR) criterion. According to this criterion, one eliminates a type v as a possible source of an oﬀ-the-
equilibrium-path oﬀer y
0 if the set of inferences that make this type weakly better oﬀ than his equilibrium
outcome is strictly included in the union of similar sets for other types v
0.
27We thus return to the case where two-dimensional uncertainty about v =( va,v y) combines
with uncertainty about agents’ degree of image-consciousness µ =( µa,µ y). The reputational








Because the insight we seek to capture is very intuitive, yet its analysis is rather technical,
we shall limit ourselves to a straightforward illustration. Suppose that (µa,µ y)=z(γa,γy),
where (γa,γy) is ﬁxed and thus known to the audience, whereas the preference parameter z is
independently distributed from (va,v y) and takes one of two extreme values: the agent is either
image indiﬀerent (z =0 )o rimage driven (z =+ ∞). Image-indiﬀerent individuals participate
i fa n do n l yi fva −ca +vyy ≥ 0, whereas image-driven ones have lexicographic preferences: they
ﬁrst maximize their reputation, then, for a given reputation, choose the action that maximizes
their current payoﬀ. Finally, we assume that if the population consisted only of image-indiﬀerent
individuals, participation would yield a better reputation than non-participation (this always
holds for y below some threshold, for example).
Clearly, participating and turning down the reward (or part of it) is a strictly dominated
strategy for image-indiﬀerent individuals. As to image-driven individuals, they put no weight on
current payoﬀs relative to reputational ones, and therefore all pool on the action(s) that yield(s)
the highest reputation. If, in equilibrium, a positive fraction of them chose to participate and
receive y0 <y ,t h e yw o u l db ei d e n t i ﬁed as image-driven types, and so their reputations would
correspond to the prior mean of the distribution of (va,v y).31 But they would then be strictly
better oﬀ pooling with those image-indiﬀerent agents who participate at price y.
The unique equilibrium thus consists in participation, at the oﬀered price y, by all image-
driven individuals and by those image-indiﬀerent individuals for whom va − ca + vyy ≥ 0.
Proposition 14 Agents may never turn down the reward, or part of it, even when this would
be publicly observed and there is uncertainty about vy.
It is worth noting that in deriving this result, we did not assume any social opprobrium
on image-consciousness; presumably, this would only reinforce agents’ reluctance to turn down
rewards. In practice, one often has a negative reaction when discovering that an acquaintance
is highly image conscious. There are two possible reasons. First, one may start questioning the
motivation behind the person’s good deeds; this is the route taken here, as in Section III and
in the next subsection. Second, one may have an intrinsic distaste for such a trait —e.g., vanity.
We are agnostic as to whether such a direct opprobrium is warranted. After all, someone who
31If they pooled at multiple values y
0, all these values would need to deliver the same average reputation, which
would therefore correspond to the prior mean.
28is highly image-conscious may be more reliable, with reputational concerns helping to discipline
his behavior; on the other hand, such a person may spend his life “pandering”, that is, doing
and telling others just what they want to see or hear.32
B.2 Conspicuous versus anonymous generosity
People often react with disapproval when someone tries to buy social prestige by revealing how
generous, disinterested, well-thinking, etc., they are. Conversely, the most admired contributions
and sacriﬁces are anonymous ones. To analyze this issue we shall assume that if the agent
participates, others will normally learn of it only with probability x<1. He can, however, make
sure that they ﬁnd out by veriﬁably disclosing his action, at a cost d —either a resource cost or
a goodwill cost, as “showing oﬀ” may hurt others’ self-esteem or make him look inconsiderate.
We again allow people to be heterogenous in two respects: ﬁrst, they diﬀer in their valuation
va for the public good, whereas vy ≡ 1 is known. Second, a fraction θ have a high value for
reputation γH
a and a fraction 1 − θ al o w e rv a l u eγL
a. In the absence of disclosure, the unit





The timing is as follows: i) the sponsor sets the reward y; ii) each individual chooses whether
to participate; iii) in case he does, he can disclose it; iv) if he participated but did not disclose,
others learn of it with probability x. Throughout this section we will assume that all relevant
supply curves are uniquely deﬁned and upward sloping (Ψ0 > 0, for the relevant Ψ), so as to
avoid equilibrium multiplicity. We examine and compare disclosure in two situations:
(a) Symmetric information about image consciousness
We ﬁrst consider the case in which γH
a = γL
a = γa is known, while va is not. In addition to
serving as a natural benchmark it is also interesting in its own right, as we shall see that there
are strategic complementarities in disclosure itself. An equilibrium with disclosure is deﬁned by
ac u t o ﬀ vD
a and the following equations:33
ΨD(vD











= ca + d − y (33)
and











An equilibrium without disclosure is deﬁned by a cutoﬀ vN
a and the following equations:
32In the same way that politicians with strong re-election concerns follow policies that they know to have
detrimental consequences, but are popular with the electorate (see Maskin and Tirole 2004).
33To obtain (33), we assume that in the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path event in which the agent does not disclose but






; this is for example
what would happen if the disclosure technology were not perfect, so that the audience learned about participation
only with probability 1 − ε,f o rε small.
29ΨN(vN










= ca − y, (35)
and
γa(1 − x)[M+(vN
a ) − E(va |φ,vN


















Proposition 15 (disclosure when image-consciousness is known). Let the functions
ΨD and ΨN in (33)-(34) be increasing. When γa is common knowledge,
(i)There exists γ∗
a and γ∗∗
a , with 0 <γ ∗
a <γ ∗∗
a , such that for γa <γ ∗
a, the agent never discloses
his contribution, for γa >γ ∗∗
a he always discloses, and for γ∗
a ≤ γa ≤ γ∗∗
a there exist multiple
norms: both disclosure and non-disclosure are equilibrium behaviors.
(ii) Where multiple norms coexist, there is more participation in the disclosure equilibrium.
Proof: (i) Because ΨD is increasing, (33) implies that vD
a is a decreasing function of γa.R e w r i t -
ing (34) as (1 − x)
¡
d + ca − vD
a − y
¢
≥ d then shows that disclosure is an equilibrium behavior
when γa exceeds some threshold. A similar reasoning applies for non-disclosure equilibria.
Next, let v∗
a and v∗∗
a denote the two valuation cutoﬀs for the reputation types γ∗
a and γ∗∗
a
respectively. Using equations (33) through (36), with (34) and (36) satisﬁed with equality at
γa = γ∗
a and γ∗∗

















(ii) This results from the fact that M+(vD
a ) − M−(vD
a ) >x [M+(vD
a ) − E(va | φ,vN
a )]. ¥
Intuitively, the absence of information about an agent’s contribution carries a lower stigma
if contributors do not disclose than if they do, which reduces the incentive to disclose. Hence,
the existence of multiple norms. Furthermore, disclosure encourages participation, through both
the increased probability that good deeds will not go unnoticed and the higher stigma attached
to the absence of information.
(b) Asymmetric information about image-consciousness
Let us now assume that γa, like va, is private information, and show that even if there is no
social opprobrium on image-consciousness this may reduce disclosure, which now itself carries a
stigma. The idea is that since the people most prone to let others know about their good deeds
are those with a high concern for self-image, disclosure of a prosocial act makes it more likely
that the act was motivated less by genuine public-mindedness (a high va) than by image-seeking
30(a high γa). Formally, suppose that it is an equilibrium under symmetric information for type
γL
a n o tt od i s c l o s ea n df o rt y p eγH
a to disclose; we will show that asymmetric information about
γa may lead to neither type disclosing.34
Let ˆ vL
a and ˆ vH
a denote the valuation cutoﬀs under symmetric information associated (in the
equilibrium under consideration) to γL
a and γH
a respectively. It must then be that ˆ vH
a < ˆ vL
a, for
two reasons: type γL
a does not disclose, and furthermore he has a lower reputational gain.
Is such separation (with respect to γa) still an equilibrium behavior under asymmetric infor-
mation? In a separating equilibrium, type γH
a participates if and only if va exceeds some cutoﬀ
vH
a ,a n dt y p eγL
a participates if and only if va is above some vL
a. Therefore, the posterior expec-
tations of va, conditioned respectively on disclosure and on the information that the individual
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a )+( 1− θ)[G(vL
a)+( 1− x)(1 − G(vL
a)]
. (37)
Proposition 16 Under asymmetric information about the extent of image-consciousness:
(i) In a separating equilibrium where the more image-conscious type discloses while the less
image-conscious one does not, disclosure of one’s contribution to the public good carries a stigma,
in that the inferences about the individual’s prosocial orientation are not as favorable as when
participation is revealed through other channels: vH
a <v L
a.
(ii) Asymmetric information about the extent of image-consciousness may reduce disclosure: for
some range of values d, the γH
a type no longer discloses when γa is unobservable.
Proof: see the appendix.
VI “Holier than Thou” sponsor competition
While sponsors of prosocial behavior may be monopolists for various reasons (legal, technical,
ﬁrst-mover and visibility advantages),35 there is often competition. Local government agencies
and charities compete for volunteering time, NGO’s and foundations compete for donations,
universities compete for speakers and visiting committee members, and so forth. Last but
not least, religions compete for believers. We therefore now investigate the impact of market
structure on equilibrium rewards and welfare.
34In a very diﬀerent context, Sadowski (2004) presents a model in which an “overeagerness” to engage in costly
signaling conveys bad news about the agent (revealing that he has few outside opportunities), so that high-ability
t y p e sm a ye v e ne n du ps i g n a l i n gl e s st h a nl o w - a b i l i t yo n e s .
35For instance, blood collection is often centralized.
31A The reversal of Bertrand competition
The ﬁrst insight is that the standard logic according to which Bertrand competition leads to
“undercutting”, or more precisely overbidding in our context where sponsors purchase a service,
may well be reversed: when a rival oﬀers y,a no ﬀer of y − ε (and not y + ε) attracts everyone
away from him. Indeed, the monetary loss for the agents is small, whereas the reputational gain
from joining the group that selects y −ε rather than the deﬁnitely more greedy group that opts
for y is substantial.36 This mechanism, in turn, explains why sponsor competition does not lead
to a situation where volunteers are well compensated for their time, or most of the monies given
to charities and the arts dissipated on perks or special events for the donors. Because rewards
tend to be bid down, not up, sponsors retain a signiﬁcant share of the surplus.
We ﬁrst verify in Proposition 17 below that (under a reasonable assumption) if two oﬀers
—made by two distinct sponsors or a single one— are close to each other, the higher oﬀer attracts
no one. Because uncertainty about va only does not allow any segmentation of demand, we
assume here that va is known, while vy is not.
Lemma 1 (monotonicity by intervals): Let va be ﬁxed. If n oﬀers, y1 <y 2 < ··· <y n,a r e
accepted in equilibrium with positive probability, then there exist 0 ≤ v1
y <v 2














Proof: An agent’s payoﬀ is va −ca +vyyi −µyE(vy|1,yi) when selecting yi, versus −µyE(vy|0)
when choosing not to participate. Standard revealed preference implies that a higher vy must
choose a (weakly) higher yi; hence the property of monotonicity by intervals. ¥
In view of Lemma 1, it seems reasonable to require monotonicity of beliefs oﬀ-the-equilibrium
path as well:
Assumption A: Types self-select monotonically, both on and oﬀ the equilibrium path: if
©
y1,···,ymª




y such that non-participation (respectively, acceptance of yi) leads to posterior beliefs equal












Proposition 17 (i) For any η>0, there exist ε>0 such that if oﬀer yi attracts a fraction of





(ii) Symmetrically, under Assumption A, for all ε there exists λ(ε), with lim
ε→0
λ(ε)=0 ,s u c h
that no oﬀer in yj ∈
¡
yi,y i + ε
¤
can attract a market share greater than λ(ε) (regardless of
whether oﬀer yi attracts a positive market share).
36A related idea applies to matching marketplaces: a marketplace charging a price slightly below that of a
competing marketplace may attract a substantially less attractive clientele (Damiano and Li (2003)).
32Proof: To establish (i), let vi+1
y denote the upper bound of the equilibrium “clientele” of oﬀer





























which is impossible for yj − yi small enough. The proof of (ii) is similar to that of (i). ¥
Let us now turn to the competitive determination of rewards. The market structure could
be one where there is a continuum of potential entrants facing a ﬁxed cost k>0 for operating in
the market, or a ﬁnite number of large competitors (who will oﬀer menus of rewards). We will
further assume that, as in the monopoly case, the payoﬀ to a sponsor from oﬀering y is equal
to the product of B − y and the number of contributors attracted by this oﬀer.37
To show that Bertrand competition in such markets need not bring all accepted equilibrium
rewards to the sponsors’ reservation level (B), we derive an equilibrium in which participating
























do not participate. The
function Y must satisfy incentive compatibility:
Y (vy) = argmax
˜ y
©
va − ca + vy˜ y − µyY −1 (˜ y)
ª
.
Together with the boundary condition, this yields:






Last, the cutoﬀ type v∗
y, if interior, must be indiﬀerent as to participation:
va − ca + v∗














Thus, a perfectly competitive market features a continuous range of rewards oﬀered and accepted






,B]. Depending on the posited market structure, these may
be oﬀered separately by a continuum of sponsors (with a mass n(vy)=( B − Y (vy))g(vy)/k
oﬀering reward vy), or as a single menu oﬀered by each of a ﬁnite number of large sponsors.
37This requires some justiﬁcation, for if sponsors were motivated solely by social welfare they would be indiﬀerent
as to who attracts contributors, and the analysis would boil down to that of the monopoly case. For sponsor
competition to be meaningful, foundations trying to raise money for diﬀerent types of medical research, museums
courting donors of paintings, or universities trying to attract speakers must put some weight on their own “local”
welfare —whether because they care about diﬀerent public goods, or because their administrators have career
concerns in addition to philanthropic goals. This is what our speciﬁcation captures.
33B Welfare-reducing competition
A perhaps even more surprising result is that competition may reduce welfare, when sponsors
can screen contributors in ineﬃcient ways. It formalizes in particular the idea of religions and
sects competing on orthodoxy, asceticism, and other costly requirements for membership (e.g.,
Berman (2000)). Suppose that there are no entry costs (k =0 )and that
a) the uncertainty is about va (we normalize again vy ≡ 1), which equals vH
a with probability
ρ or vL
a with probability 1 − ρ, where vH
a >v L
a;
b) the non-monetary cost of contributing is ca, unless the sponsor demands a “sacriﬁce”
(which it is able to verify). The cost then becomes cH
a for the high type and cL




a >c a. (39)
As a c r i ﬁce is a pure deadweight loss, whose only beneﬁt for the sponsor is to help screen the
agent’s motivation. The assumption that cH
a >c L
a reﬂects the idea that such a sacriﬁce is less
costly to a more motivated agent. For expositional simplicity, we will assume that cL
a is so large
that the low type is not willing to sacriﬁce.
Proposition 18 In the two-type case described above, a monopoly sponsor who wants both types
to contribute does not screen contributors ineﬃciently. By contrast, competing sponsors may
require high- valuation individuals to make costly sacriﬁces that represent pure deadweight losses,
thereby reducing total welfare.
Proof: see the appendix.
The intuition for this result is that non-price screening imposes a negative externality on
low-type agents, the cost of which a monopolist must fully bear but which competitive sponsors
do not internalize. Indeed, screening by requiring costly sacriﬁces has two eﬀects:
(a) it inﬂicts a deadweight loss cH
a − ca on the high type, which the sponsor must somehow
pay for;
(b) it boosts the high type’s reputation and lowers that of the low type.
When the high-type’s reputational gain exceeds the cost of sacriﬁce, the sponsor through
which he contributes can appropriate the surplus, in the form of a lower reward. If this sponsor
is a monopolist who ﬁnds it proﬁtable to serve the whole market (which is always the case when
ρ is low enough), however, he must also compensate the low type for his reputational loss. Since
reputational beneﬁts are linear and beliefs form a martingale, these losses exactly oﬀset the
high type’s reputation gains, so the net eﬀect of (b) on agents’ average utility as well as on the
monopolist’s payoﬀ is nil. This leaves only the net cost corresponding to (a), implying that a
monopoly sponsor serving the whole market will never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to require sacriﬁces.
34Things are quite diﬀerent under free entry. First, since vy is known, an agent’s choice
of ﬁnancial reward has no reputational consequence; therefore, price competition will drive
all sponsors to oﬀer B. Second, by requiring a costly sacriﬁce, entrants can now attract the
high types away from competitors who impose no such requirement, leaving low-type (or their
sponsors) with the resulting reputational loss. This “cream-skimming” leads inevitably to an
equilibrium where all active sponsors oﬀer a reward of B, with a proportion ρ of them requiring
an ineﬃcient sacriﬁce and serving the high-types, while the remaining 1 − ρ require only the
normal level of contribution ca, and serve only the low types.38
Turning ﬁnally to welfare, one can show that both types of agents are better oﬀ under
competition than under monopoly (see the appendix). The sponsors or their underlying bene-
ﬁciaries, however, must necessarily lose more than all agents gain: total participation remains
unchanged (both types still behave prosocially), the same is true of average reputation (by the
martingale property), and rewards are pure transfers. There is now, however, a deadweight
loss of ρ(cH
a − ca), corresponding to the wasteful sacriﬁces made by the high-types to separate.
Therefore, competition unambiguously reduces welfare. ¥
VII Conclusion
To gain a better understanding of prosocial behavior we sought, paraphrasing Adam Smith, to
“thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which inﬂuence it”. People’s actions indeed
reﬂect a variable mix of altruistic motivation, material self-interest and social or self image
concerns. Moreover, this mix varies across individuals and situations, presenting observers
seeking to infer a person’s true values from his behavior (or an individual judging himself in
retrospect) with a signal-extraction problem. Crucially, altering any of the three components of
motivation, for instance through the use of extrinsic incentives or a greater visibility of actions,
changes the meaning attached to prosocial (or antisocial) behavior, and hence feeds back onto
the reputational incentive to engage in it.
This simple mechanism yields many new insights concerning individuals’ contributions to
public goods, as well as the strategic decisions of public or private sponsors seeking to increase
or capture these contributions. Our results can be organized into four main themes.
— Rewards and punishments. The presence of extrinsic incentives casts suspicion on the
reason why prosocial actions are performed, acting like an increase in the noise-to-signal ratio or
even reversing the sign of the signal. This “spoiling eﬀect” depresses the reputational motive for
good behavior, and the resulting crowding out can be so large that greater incentives actually
reduce total supply. Sponsors may respond to contributors’ desire to appear intrinsically
motivated rather than greedy by publicly announcing low rewards, but then ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
38As long as ρ is not too large, this is the only equilibrium that is robust to the Cho-Kreps (1987) criterion.
35oﬀer higher ones in private, creating a commitment problem. Alternatively, contributors could
themselves consider turning down (all or part of ) the rewards that are oﬀered; they may refrain
from doing so, however, for fear that it would signal a high degree of high image-consciousness
and thereby cast another form of doubt on the true motivation for their contribution.
—P u b l i c i t ya n dd i s c l o s u r e . Prominence and memorability of contributions strengthen sig-
naling concerns and thus generally encourage prosocial behavior. When individuals are het-
erogeneous in their image concerns, however, greater prominence also acts like an increase in
the noise-to signal-ratio: good actions come to be suspected of being image-motivated, which
severely limits the eﬀectiveness of such policies. Similarly, individuals who have the option to
publicly disclose their good deeds may refrain from doing so, for fear of appearing driven by
personal vanity or a quest for social image.
— Spillovers and social norms. The inferences that can be drawn from a person’s actions
depend on what others choose to do, creating powerful spillovers that allow multiple norms of
behavior to emerge as equilibria. More generally, individuals’ decisions will be strategic com-
plements or substitutes, depending on whether their reputational concerns are (endogenously)
dominated by the avoidance of stigma or the pursuit of distinction. The ﬁrst case occurs when
there are relatively few types with low intrinsic values (the density is increasing), and when
unobserved circumstances that could prevent someone from contributing (excuses) are more
rare than those that make it inevitable or unusually easy. The second case applies in the re-
verse circumstances. When setting and publicizing their rewards, sponsors will exploit these
complementarities or substitutabilities, which respectively increase or decrease the elasticity of
the supply curve. Because they do not internalize the reputational spillovers that fall on non-
participants (or competing sponsors), however, their chosen policies will generally be ineﬃcient.
Thus, even a monopoly sponsor may oﬀer rewards that are too generous from the point of view
of social welfare.
— Competition. In the “market” for prosocial contributions, sponsors will be lead to oﬀer
agents competing opportunities for reputationally motivated sacriﬁces. Thus, in price compe-
tition the best way to steal a customer away from a rival may be to oﬀer a little less: locally,
individual supply curves are again decreasing. As result, rewards will tend be bid down rather
than up, leaving sponsors with a signiﬁcant share of the surplus even under Bertrand competi-
tion. The same “holier than thou” form of emulation can even cause sponsor competition to
reduce social welfare, by leading agents to engage in more ineﬃcient sacriﬁces than they would
have under a monopoly.
36Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
As observed earlier, if introducing a reward y reduces participation, then it must necessarily













































(a) Suppose ﬁrst that the reward y attracts new participants (area B in Figure 5a) and induces
some former ones to quit (area C). Let αA, αB, αC,a n dαD denote the weights on each area.
An increase in participation implies that αB ≥ αC. Now, E (va|a =1 )changes,
from
αDE (va |D)+αCE (va |C)
αD + αC
to
αDE (va |D)+αBE (va |B)
αD + αB
,
which is smaller since E (va |B) < min{E (va |C) , E (va |D)} and αB ≥ αC.
The impact on the reputation about vy is irrelevant when µy =0 . More generally, E (vy|a =1 )
changes
from
αDE (vy |D)+αCE (vy |C)
αD + αC
to
αDE (vy |D)+αBE (vy |B)
αD + αB
.
Given that E (vy |B) >E(vy |C) and αB ≥ αC, this represents an increase unless E (vy |D) >
E (vy |B),o r
E (vy |va ≥ K , vyy + va ≥ J) >E(vy |va ≤ K , vyy + va ≥ J) (A.1)
for some K,J, which is ruled out by the negative aﬃliation (or independence) of va and vy.39
(b) Suppose next that, as shown in Figure 5b, the introduction of the reward attracts new types
in areas E and F and does not induce any defection. Individuals with the minimal valuation for
39Indeed, if two random variables (−Y ) and X are positively aﬃliated, then EY (−Y | − Y< x
0 − T,X = x)
is increasing in both x and x
0, for all T. Hence, EY (Y | Y + x>T,X= x)=EY (Y | Y + X>T ,X= x) is
decreasing in x. Consequently, averaging this expectation over x’s larger than any given K must give a smaller
number than averaging it over x’s smaller than K
EX (EY (Y | Y + X>T ,X )|X>K ) <E X (EY (Y | Y + X>T ,X ) | X<K )],
which means that E[(Y |Y + X>T ,X>K ) <E(Y |Y + X>T ,X<K ).
37money v−
y =0participate for va ≥ v∗∗
a ≡ ca − R(y), and by assumption v∗∗
a <v ∗
a ≡ ca − R(0).
From part (a) of the proof, we know that new equilibrium reputation R(y) of participants is less
than the one —which we denote as R— that would obtain if only those in area E had joined in as
a result of the reward y being oﬀered. Let us now evaluate
R(0) − R = µa [E (va|va ≥ v∗
a) − E (va|va <v ∗
a)] − µa [E (va|va ≥ v∗∗
a ) − E (va|va <v ∗∗
a )]
−µy [E (vy|va ≥ v∗
a) − E (vy|va <v ∗
a)] − µy [E (vy|va ≥ v∗∗
a ) − E (vy|va <v ∗∗
a )].
T h e( w e a k l y )n e g a t i v ea ﬃliation between va and vy implies that E (vy|va ≥ X) is nonincreasing
in X, whereas E (vy|va <X) is nondecreasing; therefore,
E (va|va ≥ v∗
a) − E (va|va ≥ v∗∗
a ) ≤ 0 ≤ E (vy|va <v ∗
a) − E (vy|va <v ∗∗
a ),
hence
R(0) − R ≥ µa [E (va|va ≥ v∗
a) − E (va|va <v ∗
a)] − µa [E (va|va ≥ v∗∗















This, in turn, implies that
Ψ(v∗∗

















a + R(0) − R ≥ v∗∗
a − v∗
a + R(0) − R(y) ≡ 0,
which contradicts the fact that Ψ is increasing. Therefore, Figure 5b cannot represent an
equilibrium, and thus R(y) <R (0) necessarily. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
With Ω(a,y)=0 , the regression coeﬃcients in (16)-(17) are independent of a and are
therefore functions of y only, so that the diﬀerential system (14)-(15) becomes linear. Since y
is simply a ﬁxed parameter, in what follows we will temporarily omit from the notation the
dependence of all functions on this argument.
As only marginal values matter for decisions (and therefore also inference), let us diﬀerentiate

































This implies that dE (va|a)/da = ρh(a) and dE (vy|a)/da = χh(a), where h(a) ≡ C00(a)− ¯ R0(a)
38is a solution to the linear diﬀerential equation
h(a)+µh0(a)=C00(a), (A.4)




C00(a − µz) e−zdz, (A.5)
noting that the integral is convergent due to the fact that, whatever the sign of µ, C00(a − µz)
has a polynomial approximation as z → +∞. This function has the following properties:
C0(a) − µˆ h(a)=
Z +∞
0
C0(a − µz) e−zdz, (A.6)
C00(a) − µˆ h0(a)=
Z +∞
0
C00(a − µz) e−zdz = ˆ h(a). (A.7)
The ﬁrst equation is obtained from integration by parts of (A.5). The second, obtained by
diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst, shows that ˆ h is a solution to the diﬀerential equation (A.4). The generic
solution is therefore h(a)=ˆ h(a)+κe−a/µ, where κ is a constant of integration. These additional
solutions, however, are not linked to the problem’s economic “fundamentals” (e.g., the cost
function C(·)). Moreover, unless κ =0 , |h(a)| will tend to +∞ as a tends to +∞ (if µ<0) or
−∞ (if µ>0), meaning that a marginal increase in contribution will have an arbitrarily large
eﬀect on reputation and utility. Excluding such counterintuitive, “bubble-like” solutions leaves
κ =0and h = ˆ h as the only economically sensible solution.
Finally, using (18), the ﬁrst-order condition (11) takes the form:
va + y · vy = C0(a) − µh(a)=
Z +∞
0
C0(a − µz) e−zdz.
Replacing µ = µ(y) everywhere yields (18), (19), and the other results. ¥
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r i e s1a n d2






























a +2 yσay + y2σ2
y
¢2 . (A.9)
Substituting into (22) immediately yields Corollary 1 in the case y =0 , and the condition given




yθ2y2 < 2¯ µaθ2y +¯ µyθ2 ≡ L(y). (A.10)
The left hand side is a second order polynomial in y2; it is necessarily convex and symmetric
over all of R, and takes value Q(0) = ¯ vy/k > 0 a tt h eo r i g i n .T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei sa ni n c r e a s i n g
linear function with L(0) = ¯ µyθ2. Consequently:
i) if L(0) ≥ Q(0), then for any ¯ µa > 0,L (y) intersects Q(y) once on R∗
+ and once on R−
+.
Let y0
1 < 0 <y 1 denote these two points.
ii) if L(0) <Q (0) then there exists a unique µ∗
a > 0 for which L(y) has a (single) tangency
point y∗ > 0 with Q(y). For all ¯ µa <µ ∗
a,Q (y˙ ) >L (y) on all of R∗ ,s o¯ a0(y) > 0 everywhere. For
all ¯ µa >µ ∗
a, however, L(y) intersects Q(y) twice on R∗
+, at points that we denote 0 <y 1 <y 2.
The properties, together with the linearity of L in ¯ µay, yield the desired results. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
It is straightforward to verify that the solution described in the proposition is a solution to
the general problem with C0(a)=ka, and in fact the only possible one for which ∂E(va|a,y)/∂a
and ∂E(vy|a,y)/∂a, or equivalently ρ(a,y) and χ(a,y), are independent of a. Indeed, one can
replicate the proof of Proposition 2 but now with C00 ≡ k, which implies that ˆ h(a)=k. The
only diﬀerence is the presence of the term Ω(y)2 = k2 Va r[R(y)] in the denominator of ρ and χ
(see (16)-(17)), leading to the ﬁxed-point equation deﬁning Ω(y):




















Since Z(Ω2) is always positive but tends to zero as Ω2 becomes large, there is always at least one
solution. When ωay =0 , moreover, Z(Ω2) is the sum of two squared terms that are decreasing
in Ω2, so the solution is unique. When ωay 6=0 , one cannot rule out multiple equilibria; note,
however, that those that are stable (in a standard, tâtonnement sense) are those where Z cuts
the diagonal from above. This implies that in any stable equilibrium Ω is increasing in k, which





’s by a common “publicity factor” x is the same, from the point of
view of inference, as multiplying k2 by x, and therefore it has (in any stable equilibrium) the
above-mentioned dampening eﬀects on ρ(y) and χ(y). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0
In what follows, we shall denote v∗
a(y) simply as v∗
a. Social welfare is equal to W = π + ¯ U,
where π(y)=[ 1 − G(v∗


















[va − ca + y]dG(va). (A.12)
by the martingale property of reputations. At the optimal reward y∗,d π / d y=0so
1 − G(v∗






























Using (A.12) together with Ψ(v∗
a) ≡ ca − y and dv∗
a/dy =1 /Ψ0(v∗
a) to evaluate this expression
establishes that dW/dy |y=y∗ < 0 if and only if condition (29) is satisﬁed.
In the uniform case (va ∼ U [0,1]), condition (29) becomes µa/2 > 1−v∗
a; substituting in the
appropriate values shows that a marginal decrease in the reward from y∗ =( B+ca−1−µa/2)/2
increases welfare if and only if B − ca < (µa/2) − 1. This inequality is consistent with the
conditions that 0 <v ∗








Proof of Proposition 11, part (ii) For any menu designed by the sponsor, revealed preference
implies that an individual with a higher vy selects a (weakly) higher reward. Suppose that all
types vy ≥ w contribute. We shall keep w as ﬁxed (and therefore also the utility from non-
participation U(w)=−µyM−(w) and show that an optimal menu in this class must involve
separation on [w,v+
y ], where (v−
y ,v+
y ) denotes the (interior of) the support of vy.
By the revelation principle, a menu can be characterized by allocation of income Y (vy),
reputation r(vy) and resulting overall utility U(vy)=va − ca + vyY (vy)+r(vy) for all types












). The following Lemma characterizes the (cumulative) allocation of
reputation up to any vy ≤ v+
y .
Lemma 2 For any feasible menu such that the cutoﬀ for participation is w,
V (vy) ≡ E (r(v)|v ∈ [w,vy)) ≥ E (v|v ∈ [w,vy)), (A.14)
with equality if and only if the menu is separating (r(v)=v) on [w,vy].
41Proof: If Y (v) >Y(vy) for all v>v y then there is no pooling of types above vy with types
below it, so by the martingale property (A.14) holds with equality. Suppose therefore that
z ≡ sup{v ≥ vy|Y (v)=Y (vy)} >v y and that t ≡ inf {v ≥ w|Y (v)=Y (vy)} <v y. Then Y is
constant on [t,w] implying that all types in this interval must also receive the same reputation
r(vy)=E (v|v ∈ [t,z)). Hence:
E (r(v)|v ∈ [t,vy)) = E (v|v ∈ [t,z)) >E(v|v ∈ [t,vy)). (A.15)











E (r(v)|v ∈ [t,vy)),
By deﬁnition of t there is no pooling between [w,t] and [t,v+
y ], so E (r(v)|v ∈ [w,t)) = E (v|v ∈ [w,t)).
Together with (A.15), this establishes the claim. ¥
We now consider the problem of the sponsor designing an optimal contract, which can be
written as





Y (vy) h(vy) dvy
)
, subject to:







The ﬁrst and last constraints follow directly from the deﬁnitions of U and V ; the third one
expresses incentive-compatibility (vy ˙ Y (vy)+˙ r(vy)=0 ) , while the fourth corresponds to (A.14).
Using the ﬁrst constraint to eliminate Y (vy) and denoting as ζ(vy),θ(vy)h(vy) and ξ(vy) the
multipliers associated to the subsequent constraints, the Hamiltonian is
H = h[(r + va − ca − U)/vy + θV] − ζ [(r + va − ca − U)/vy]+ξrh, (A.16)























= ˙ ξ + hθ =0 , (A.19)
Combining (A.17) with the transversality condition ζ(v+
y )=0yields
42ζ(vy)vy = −[1 − H(vy)]. (A.20)
Suppose now that the constraint V (vy) ≥
R vy
w vh(v) dv is not binding on some interval [t,z].


















By the monotone hazard rate the right-hand side is strictly increasing in vy, contradicting the
fact that ξ must be constant. Therefore, it must be that V (vy)=
R vy
w vh(v) dv for all vy ≥ w,
which by Lemma 2 means that the menu is separating on [w,vy). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n12
(i) A sponsor with the ability to credibly commit to (or veriﬁably disclose) the terms of the
contract he oﬀers can always replicate the equilibrium choice of one without commitment, and
therefore he can do at least as well. Since we show below that he in fact chooses a diﬀerent fee
(as long as R0 6=0), he must in fact do strictly better.
(ii) Consider the case where there is disclosure. If the sponsor still chooses y = yC, the







≡ 0 by deﬁnition, v∗
a(yC)=vC
a and therefore ¯ aD(yC)=


































where the second equation follows from the deﬁnition of v∗
a(y). Therefore, if R0 < 0 we have
¯ a
0
D(yC) > ¯ a0
C(yC), implying that the optimal price under disclosure is strictly above yC, since
π0
D(yC)=¯ a0
D(yC)(B − yC) − ¯ aD(yC)=¯ a0
D(yC)(B − yC) − ¯ aC(yC)
> ¯ a0
C(yC)(B − yC) − ¯ aC(yC)=π0
C(yC) ≡ 0
and πD was assumed to be quasiconcave. Hence yD >y C, resulting in a higher supply ¯ aD(yD) >
¯ aD(yC)=¯ aC(yC). The same reasoning works in reverse when R0 > 0.
(iii) Suppose that the sponsor can secretly oﬀer a reward y diﬀerent from the announced
yD. If R0 < 0, then yD >y C as we have just seen, so ex-post he would like to secretly oﬀer the
lower payment yC; the agent, however, can insist on receiving yD. By contrast, when R0 > 0,
43yD <y C so it is optimal for the sponsor to secretly oﬀer an increase yC −yD to the agent, who
will happily accept. Anticipating this collusive renegotiation, the audience properly expects that
the actual fee will be yC and not yD. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 6
i) In a separating equilibrium, the individual’s cutoﬀ is assessed to be vH
a in case of disclosure,
and vL






a ) − xM+(vL
















is given by (37). The cutoﬀs vH
a and vL



























= ca − y, (A.25)
assuming as usual that the Ψ-type functions on the left-hand side are increasing in each case.
These two inequalities, together with type vH




ii) First, recall that under symmetric information about γa, the cutoﬀ b vH













= ca + d − y, (A.27)
while disclosure occurs only if
γH
a (1 − x)
£
M+(b vH




Let us now demonstrate part (ii) by way of an example: suppose that x =0(or more
generally that x is not too large). Then (A.23) and (A.28) reduce to:
RH
D(vH











a ) − ¯ va]
θG(vH














respectively. Note that b RH
D(va) >R H






> 0, and using the fact that
44vH
a − ca + y + RH
D(vH
a ) − d = b vH
a − ca + y + b RH
D(b vH
a ) − d =0 ,
we obtain b vH
a <v H
a , and therefore RH
D(vH
a ) < b RH
D(b vH
a ). Therefore, for RH
D(vH




a types will no longer occur under asymmetric information about γa. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 8
(i) As long as ρ is not too small, it is optimal for the monopolist to get both types on board.
If he does not demand any sacriﬁce, he then sets y so as to make the low type indiﬀerent:
y = ca − vL
a − µa
¡




where ¯ va ≡ ρvH
a +( 1− ρ)vL
a is the prior mean. The sponsor’s payoﬀ is then:
π1 ≡ B − y = B − ca + vL
a + µa
¡




Suppose now that the high type is asked to sacriﬁce. Rewards are then yL and yH, respectively,
where yL = ca − vL
a and (from incentive compatibility)
yH = yL + cH







The sponsor’s payoﬀ is then






hence the ﬁrst result.
(ii) As mentioned earlier, under free entry all sponsors oﬀer, and all contributors accept, a
reward equal to B. Moreover, it is now an equilibrium for the high type to separate from the
low type by choosing to sacriﬁc e( o p t i n gf o ras p o n s o rw h oi m p o s e ss u c har e q u i r e m e n t ) ,i fa n d
only if
cH







In the resulting equilibrium (described in the text), both types of agents are better oﬀ than
under monopoly: the low type’s payoﬀ rises from µavL
a to µavL
a + vL
a − ca + B,w h i l et h eh i g h
type’s payoﬀ increases by at least vL
a − ca + B, which is positive from the condition that the
monopoly prefers to enlist both types. The fact that sponsors must necessarily lose more than
the agents gain, resulting in a net welfare loss from competition, was established in the text. ¥
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